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22 April 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

LATE ITEM

The situation in Algeria as of 0630 EST remains unclear beyond the fact that a military revolt against De Gaulle's liberal Algerian policy was launched in Algiers last night. The Paris government admits the insurrection, but insists this morning that the "coup" is confined to the city of Algiers. The insurrectionists, in a communiqué signed by four well-known French generals, claim they control all Algeria and the Sahara. However, the only military units publicly identified as supporting the revolt are the First Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment and the predominently Moslem Seventh Regiment.

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The timing of this move against De Gaulle by military partisans of "French Algeria" is connected with the widespread belief that a negotiated settlement involving Algerian independence was about to be achieved. Although the rebel Provisional Algerian Government (PAG) refused to initiate public negotiations with the French government as scheduled at Evian on 7 April--because of De Gaulle's refusal to recognize the PAG's claim to represent all Algeria--the fact that behind-the-scenes PAG-French talks have continued has been an open secret. Moreover, De Gaulle's 11 April press conference--in which he emphasized more clearly than ever before his intention to negotiate Algerian independence-- appeared to have dispelled PAG doubts as to his intentions and it was expected that negotiations would soon be announced. The PAG has not yet commented on the situation, and will probably take a cautious attitude until the picture becomes clearer.

The outcome of the insurrection will depend largely on the reaction of the European settlers, Moslems, and other military units in Algeria, but also on the reactions in France itself. The settlers and their rightist sympathizers in France are expected to welcome the coup as a blow to the "abandonment" of Algeria by De Gaulle. The Moslem population of Algeria, which was reportedly discouraged by De Gaulle's 11 April press conference because of fear that it had reduced chances for an early end of hostilities, could react violently—with or without PAG incitement—to any indications that the French army intends to prolong the war.

De Gaulle's skillful management of military sensibilities and his firm stand during the January 1960 insurrection in Algiers,

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in which some army paratroop units wavered in their loyalty, had for some time apparently discouraged active military plotting against him. The four generals heading the new insurrection--retired Army generals Henri Zeller and Raoul Salan (a former French commander in Algeria), retired Air Force General Edmond Jouhaud, and Air Force General Maurice Challe (who resigned early this year from the position as NATO commander for Central Europe) -- are prominent largely because of their anti-Gaullist sentiments and activities. They are not believed to enjoy widespread support in the armed services, although much of the French military have sympathized with their "French Algeria" views. The current insurrection appears more serious than the settlers' revolt of 1960 in that this time some army units are overtly opposed to the government, and thus openly pose the problem of "unity of the army." The new French Chief of Staff of National Defense, General Jean Olie, who took office on 1 March, lacks the prestige of his predecessor, General Paul Ely, who had played a major role in maintaining the armed services' loyalty to De Gaulle.


22 April 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

	25X1
	Ī
	25X1
3. Angola: Economic breakdown seen if withdrawal of Europeans from rural areas continues. (Page 11)	
4. Congo: Tshombé's control in Katanga apparently weak (Page 11)	ens.
	25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt



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	Congo: President Tshombé's control of Katanga appears more precarious than at any time since the Congo's independence. The American consulate in Elisabethville reports that anti-Tshombé sentiment is rising among the local population, and that demonstrations—stemming from economic grievances as well as resentment against Tshombé's Belgian advisers—may take place at any time. Tshombé has in large measure rescinded his boycott against UN troops, but animosity between the UN and the Katanga government remains strong.			<i>ひ ≮</i> 25X1
	22 Apr 61	DAILY BRIEF	ii	
			25X1	aa n aanaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Situation in Angola

The area of the current disturbances is the source of most of the coffee crop, which accounted for more than a third of Angola's export earnings in 1960 and is the principal dollar earner for Portugal. Considerable coffee is still on hand from previous crops as a result of Portugal's commitments to the International Coffee Agreement, but an American official—whose company recently shut down all its oil exploration activities in the Cabinda exclave as a result of the unrest—believes the economy will run down as soon as these stocks are exhausted.

The uncertainty over Angola's future is causing concern in Lisbon over the stability of the escudo. Serious economic deterioration in Angola might threaten the stability of the Salazar regime.

Nationalists, most of them Communist oriented, from Portuguese territories in Asia and Africa have been meeting in Casablanca. The final resolution, adopted on 20 April, announced that an organization will be set up in Morocco to coordinate the activities of the various anti-Portuguese groups. This organization apparently will supersede the Conakry-based Revolutionary Front for the Independence of the Portuguese Territories (FRAIN), which recently has been weakened by factionalism and by an inability to obtain international publicity. Holden Roberto's Angola People's Union (UPA), which reportedly triggered the current outbreak, is not affiliated with the new Morocco-based organization.

The movement of additional troops from Portugal to Angola is continuing, both by air and by sea. More than 12,000 troops, of whom more than 4,000 are white, are now stationed in the province. Approximately 35,000 army troops remain in metropolitan Portugal. In addition, about 8,000 troops, the bulk of them native, are stationed in Mozambique.

Tshombe's Position Deteriorating in Katanga

Tshombe's regime is threatened by a combination of UN hostility and fading popular support. He has rejected demands of his recalcitrant legislature that he share his executive power with a premier, but it is doubtful that he can continue his one-man rule indefinitely, aided only by Belgian advisers.

Tshombe's rule in northern Katanga has long been threatened by hostile Baluba tribesmen, but until recently he appeared to enjoy the support of most non-Baluba groups in the south. Lately, however, there has been an increasing reaction to Tshombe's extensive reliance on Belgians and his employment of South African mercenaries in the Katangan armed forces. Popular dissatisfaction with prevailing low wage levels has stimulated resentment against the Belgians, who are felt to have monopolized highly paid positions.

Tshombe's difficulties are compounded by his bad relations with the UN, which recently airlifted Indian troops into Katanga. One UN official predicted on 20 April that "a showdown" between the UN and Tshombe was rapidly approaching.

A Belgian adviser to the Leopoldville government has opined that Tshombé has become a liability for the Belgians and that Brussels would take a "hard line" with him. Belgians in Elisabethville reportedly are apprehensive concerning their future there in view of renewed UN efforts to secure the withdrawal of foreign advisers.

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